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The effects of litigation on mergers and acquisitions 
Kun Zhao 
 
This paper investigates whether litigation impacts merger and acquisition outcomes for defendant 
firms. Our results indicate that being a defendant of a single lawsuit within the last two years 
appears to significantly increase the premium paid to this firm when it becomes the target of a 
takeover attempt, while incurring multiple lawsuits over this timeframe decreases the premium 
(albeit not significantly so). Litigation is also correlated with takeover announcements, as 
incurring lawsuits within the last two years is associated with a significant increase in target firm 
candidacy (the likelihood of becoming a target), and incurring litigation after the takeover 
announcement is associated with a significant decrease in takeover completion. We explain our 
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Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities have attracted global attention in recent years. In this 
context, predicting target candidacy and its underlying determinants are at the forefront of 
scholars’ and investors’ concerns. The development of statistical models is motivated by the fact 
that the capability to predict takeover targets is the foundation of potentially effective investment 
strategies (Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009). Besides exploring the characteristics of 
takeover targets (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Powell and Yawson, 2005), improving the 
accuracy of predicting merger announcement and takeover completion (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Brar, 
Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009; Cornett et al., 2011) is also a crucial issue within the M&A 
field.  
Predicting target candidacy/merger announcements has been linked to a significant amount of 
publicly available information (e.g., Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis, 2009; Cornett et al., 2011), 
but few studies have considered the effects of litigation on this process. The need to hand-collect 
data is one major obstacle. Litigation should be a pivotal factor, as lawsuits result in a negative 
market reaction and place the defendant in financial distress (Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 1994). 
Litigation, paired with these market reactions, has the potential to be a good approach for 
predicting merger candidacy and takeover completion. In this paper, we fill in this gap by 
investigating the effects of litigation on mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&As). Specifically, 
using a large and complete sample of shareholder class action lawsuits from 1998 to 2014 
recorded by Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), we investigate how 
litigation affects the takeover process.  
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, this is the first study, to our knowledge, to 
explore the combined effects of all litigation lawsuits on M&As. Previous studies (e.g., Krishnan, 
Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson, 2012) focus on acquisition-oriented lawsuits, which 
incorporate only a small portion of litigation types. In addition, our analysis integrates research 
done by Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis (2009) with Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) and 
extends their work by incorporating the effects of litigation. Using a comprehensive dataset of 
U.S. firms from 1998 to 2014, we find that litigation helps predict target candidacy, takeover 
completion, and takeover premium. Our results should be useful for investors by showing that 
they should consider potential litigation effects before they make their investment decisions. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a literature review and 
briefly summarizes some variables that measure firm and deal characteristics which are used in 
our analyses. In Section III, we outline our hypotheses. Section IV discusses our data and 
methodology. Section V interprets our results. Section VI concludes and Section VII discusses 
the limitations of this paper. 
II. Literature Review 
Takeover candidacy indicates that a company is a good candidate for purchase. Abundant 
empirical studies tend to predict takeover candidates by using financial and other publicly 
available information. Many researchers have explored and improved the models of predicting 
takeover likelihood. Previous studies suggest that certain variables can influence and determine a 
target’s takeover probability. To find the determinants predicting takeover likelihood, Palepu 
(1986) uses a sample of 163 targets from 1971 to 1979 and tests six hypotheses that are 
frequently discussed in the literature. He demonstrates the firm size hypothesis, which states that 
the acquisition probability decreases as the firm size increases and illustrates that a target firm’s 
size increases the cost associated with the target’s defense, causing a negative sign in the 
acquisition likelihood. Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen (2009) also document that firm size is a 
determinant of M&A. They point out that it is more defensive for a target to have a similar size as 
its acquirer, showing that the relative size is also important. Acquirers are more interested in 
larger targets because of economies of scale. Potential bidders are required to make trade-offs. In 
addition, a robust size effect is that the abnormal return associated with acquiring small firms is 
larger than that of acquiring large firms. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) show that this 
size effect is not reversed over time. 
Marris (1964) and Kuehn (1969) first include the market-to-book ratio as a determinant of 
acquisition probability. The assumption is that a firm with lower market-to-book value is cheaper 
to buy. They also confirm this negative relation between the takeover likelihood and the market-
to-book ratio. However, Palepu (1986) suspects this assumption by stating that the book value of 
a firm may not reflect its assets’ replacement value. He finds statistically insignificant 
coefficients for the market-to-book ratio in his acquisition likelihood model using a U.S firm 
sample from 1971 to 1979 and demonstrates that his suspicion is right. Subsequently, Davis, 
Gerald, and Stout (1992) use takeover targets during 1980–1990 and find that firms with a higher 
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market-to-book value could lower the risk of takeover. They state that takeovers tend to locate 
underperforming firms; therefore, a higher market-to-book value indicates a lower risk. This 
result is consistent with early studies, but inconsistent with that of Palepu (1986). All in all, the 
influence of the market-to-book ratio on the takeover likelihood remains ambiguous. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) show that leverage affects a firm’s acquisition probability. They 
illustrate that leverage could affect a firm’s market value and thus influences the probability of 
takeover. Using an assumption that a firm’s financial structure is controlled by its management, 
the authors state that issuing debt makes a firm unsafe from bankruptcy and thus encourages the 
management to maximize profit. In this way, a firm gets a higher market value, which, in general, 
is positively related to the price a bidder needs to pay, and decreases the probability of takeover. 
Jensen (1986) points out that leverage is associated with costs. The optimal debt-to-equity ratio 
can raise agency costs and lower the acquisition likelihood. Using a sample from 1979 to 1990, 
Billett (1996) also finds that the likelihood of being acquired decreases as the firm’s leverage 
increases. He illustrates this phenomenon as the coinsurance effect. The coinsurance effect states 
that regardless of whether the bidder’s assets or the takeover synergy coinsures the target debt, 
wealth will transfer from the bidder and target equity holders to the target debt holders. Since this 
wealth transfer decreases takeover profit, it lowers the acquisition probability. These findings are 
not a spurious by-product of the negative correlation between the takeover probability and 
leverage. 
Cash can either increase or decrease the takeover probability, and the results are inconsistent. On 
the one hand, some studies find that the likelihood of being acquired decreases as the firm’s cash 
flow increases. First, if a target has excess cash flow, this could enhance its defense against an 
unwanted bid and decrease the likelihood of being a target (Harford, J. 1999). According to 
Bagwell (1991), Stulz (1988), and Dann and DeAngelo (1988), targets can use excess cash flow 
to repurchase their stock, file antitrust litigation, and acquire a bidder’s competitor to defend a 
takeover. On the other hand, some papers illustrate that the probability of being acquired 
increases as the firm’s cash flow increases. Powell (1997) argues that there is a positive 
relationship between cash flow and takeover probability. He demonstrates this by modeling 
takeover likelihood using a sample of U.K. firms from 1984 to 1991. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999) also suggest that cash is positively related to acquisition likelihood, as it can 
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increase a bidder’s gain by giving the bidder liquid assets that are useful to finance the 
acquisition. 
Harford (2005) studies the characteristics that drive M&A waves and concludes that sales growth 
is one of the determinants. Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis (2009) use sales growth as a proxy 
for inefficient management and demonstrate a negative effect on acquisition likelihood. Higher 
sales growth indicates that a firm operates quite well and thus reduces its likelihood of being a 
target. Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) utilize sales growth as a proxy for economies of 
scale and scope and state that mergers can be motivated by reducing cost through economies. 
Their final results also certify the negative relationship between sales growth and target 
candidacy. 
The price-to-earnings (PE) ratio is the ratio of a company’s share price to its earnings per share. It 
is used to measure a firm’s performance. The PE ratio affects the takeover likelihood on both 
bidders’ and targets’ sides. Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Yang (2014) find a positive significant 
relationship between the PE ratio and the acquiring likelihood of bidders. Palepu (1986) uses the 
PE ratio to predict takeover targets and concludes that there is a positive but insignificant 
relationship. As a proxy for undervaluation, the PE ratio is included in the study done by Brar, 
Giamouridis, and Liodakis (2009) to predict European takeover targets. 
In addition to all these tested variables, many researchers are still working on developing a 
prediction model. Brar, Giamouridis, and Liodakis (2009) test different variables, such as the 
industry disturbance dummy, profit margin, asset turnover, and return on equity to determine 
their associations with takeover bids. Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) include more 
characteristics and use them to measure the management’s motives related to M&As. Our paper 
includes not only variables that are frequently suggested in previous literature, but also a 
litigation dummy and a multiple suits dummy to examine the effects of litigation on M&A 
activities. 
Furthermore, predicting takeover success has recently attracted researchers’ attention, as it can 
help investors and arbitrageurs identify profitable situations. Many researchers have attempted to 
use publicly available information to predict takeover success. Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) 
include many measurements to assess a target’s financial situation, vulnerability to takeover 
attempts, status in its industry, and management attitude in their model; they document that the 
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target’s management attitude, which is measured by whether it accepts cash tender offers or not, 
the firm’s growth in earnings, its current ratio, payout ratio, and PE ratio have a significant 
influence on predicting takeover completion. Some researchers hold the idea that premiums are 
important in the takeover process, while unfortunately they have not found significant support for 
their thinking. Walkling (1985) uses logistic regression to test bid premium size, targets’ 
managerial resistance, the percentage of shares owned by the bidder, solicitation fees, and the 
effect of competing bids on predicting takeover completion. Using tender offers from 1972 to 
1977, he concludes that the bid premium is a determinant predicting takeover completion. He 
mentions that the insignificant previous findings are due to a failure to specify the premium. 
More recently, however, Branch and Yang (2003) still do not find a statistically significant 
relation between the bid premium and takeover completion. 
Price movements are also predictors in the tender offer completion model (Samuelson and 
Rosenthal, 1986). They propose that a target’s stock prices during the offer period are 
informative and help predict takeover completion. The result shows that higher stock prices 
increase the probability of takeover completion, leading to the conclusion that market prices have 
the ability to calibrate themselves well. Based on the limitations of their sample data, however, 
these conclusions need to be verified with more consideration. Branch and Yang (2003) also 
attempt to use the post-price variable to predict takeover completion, but they find it to be 
statistically insignificant. 
The takeover payment method also has its place in predicting takeover completion. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) show that cash payment has a positive influence on takeover success, as using cash 
gives the market a positive signal about the acquirer’s financial ability. On the contrary, Mitchell 
and Pulvino (2001) state that a cash payment increases the failure of takeover completion. 
Following their work, Branch and Yang (2003) use tender offers from the 1991 to 2001 period 
and find a positive significant relationship between cash payment and takeover completion, 
which supports Myers and Majluf’s idea. 
Moreover, Branch, Wang, and Yang (2008) collect a sample from 1991 to 2004 and demonstrate 
that four variables, target resistance, arbitrage spread, deal structure, and transaction size, play 
significant and dominated roles in their takeover success prediction model. Since abundant 
variables have been used to test their associations with predicting takeover completion, our paper 
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also includes a number of firm characteristics and deal characteristics. We aim to find a model 
with a reduced number of significant variables. Our main objection, however, is to identify 
litigation’s effects in the takeover completion process. 
Researchers never lose their interest in finding the determinants of takeover payment, as the 
means of financing is crucial to investors. Corporate finance usually emphasizes the influence of 
acquisition finance on taxation and information asymmetries (Franks, Harris, and Mayer, 1988). 
Using the sample of U.K. and U.S. acquisitions, Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) fail to find a 
theory of the takeover payment choice.  
The relative size between the target and the bidder is a determinant predicting the takeover 
payment method, but the results remains inconsistent. Grullon, Michaely, and Swary (1997) find 
a negative relationship between the relative size and all-cash payment. However, Martin (1996) 
finds insignificant results. One possible explanation for this inconsistency could be the different 
measurements of relative size. Zhang (2001) uses U.K. acquisitions from 1990 to 1999 and 
confirms that the all-cash payment method is negatively associated with the relative size between 
the target and the acquirer. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) state that takeover payment has a strong relationship with a bidder’s 
debt situation. Since cash payment usually leads to debt financing, increasing the stress of a 
firm’s financial situation, if the acquirer has a high leverage ratio, it would decline a cash 
payment. They also argue that cash payment relates to the management’s need to maintain the 
current corporate structure. Unfortunately, they fail to test this theory due to data limitations. 
Moreover, they document that cross-border deals are positively associated with cash payment. 
Bidders tend to choose cash payment in cross-border deals because of the high trading costs in 
foreign markets, the high exchange risk, and more government limitations. 
Over the past twenty years, takeover premium has played an important role in the M&A field 
since it closely relates to returns. Officer (2003) uses a Securities Data Corporation (SDC) sample 
from 1988 to 2000 and documents that the market value of both targets and bidders affects 
takeover premium. A larger target’s market value leads to a lower takeover premium while a 
larger bidder’s market value causes them to pay a higher premium. He also tests deal 
characteristics’ explanatory power, but his results are insignificant.  
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Bugeja and Walter (1995) state that a target’s previous performance affects takeover premium. 
They hypothesize that the target’s poor performance leads to a higher premium since bidders 
believe that their management is much more efficient. However, this hypothesis is rejected, as the 
findings are insignificant. In addition, a significant and negative relationship between free cash 
flow and takeover premium is confirmed in their paper. 
The subject of litigation is popular in the field of law. Unfortunately, however, the effects of 
litigation are not fully explored within M&A, and existing empirical studies mainly focus on 
acquisition-oriented litigation or shareholder litigation in M&A transactions, which constitute 
only a small portion of litigation types. One potential reason is the need to hand-collect data. 
Thompson and Thomas (2004) study acquisition-oriented litigation lawsuits and find that 
acquisition-oriented lawsuits lead to a higher premium since the bidders offer a higher price to 
buy the targets’ shareholders’ support. Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012) 
explore the types of bids that are likely to trigger litigation, finding that larger offers, offers in 
which the bidder has previous shareholdings in the target, and offers that involve more cash 
financing are more likely to be involved in shareholder litigation problems. They also state that 
the takeover premium is higher if the target becomes involved in shareholder litigation in the 
M&A process. In this way, they find that M&A-related litigation can influence the bidding 
process. 
Even though the effects of litigation on M&As have not been fully explored, many researchers 
hold the position that investors should take potential litigation effects into consideration before 
they make their investment decisions. In the case of Qwest Communications International Inc., 
analysts think litigation is undesirable within takeovers, as investors are unsure about the actions 
of any potential suitors; thus, they need to wait at least one or two years.1 To provide new 
evidence on the importance of litigation in the M&A field, in this paper, we explore the effects of 
litigation on M&As using a significantly larger and more complete sample than those utilized in 
other papers. We obtain our lawsuit sample from SCAC. Our sample contains lawsuits filed from 
1998 to 2014. Unlike other studies, we do not focus on exploring the effects of acquisitions on 
litigation; on the contrary, we are more interested in the effects of litigation on M&As. In 
                                                          




addition, we do not restrict our litigation type to a merger-oriented one since we are more 
interested in observing the effects of all litigation types within M&As. 
III. Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS I: A firm is more likely to become a target if it has been subject to a lawsuit. 
A firm’s stock price usually fluctuates when it is subject to a lawsuit. In general, the market 
reacts negatively to the firm and causes its stock price to drop (Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 1994; 
Gande, and Lewis, 2009). The theory behind this is the investors’ overreaction to the firm’s stock 
price. Psychological phenomena, such as misvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004), 
are thus reflected in the stock returns. If a firm’s price decreases too much, the firm can be 
undervalued in this litigation period and become a good candidate for purchase. Further, lawsuit 
types expose many potential firm problems, such as management inefficiencies, insider trading 
problems, and false revenue disclosures. This gives bidders a chance to reevaluate both the 
market and the defendant. Once bidders find out that the defendant is not as bad as its price 
reflects, they could make a bid. In this way, we suppose that the probability of receiving a tender 
offer is increased if the firm has been involved in a litigation lawsuit. 
HYPOTHESIS II-a: Once a takeover bid is announced, the probability of takeover completion 
is no longer impacted by a prior lawsuit, which is conditional upon the announcement. 
The hypothesis is that once a takeover bid is announced, the probability of takeover completion 
will not be influenced, regardless of whether the target is involved in a litigation lawsuit prior to 
the takeover announcement or not. Bidders choose to give a tender offer only when they find out 
that the target serves their interests. In hypothesis I, we propose that litigation lawsuits should 
incorporate useful information about the target, and that investors should take this into 
consideration when they plan to make a tender offer. Since this happens before the takeover 
announcement, litigation lawsuits and multiple suits should not have a significant effect on 
takeover completion. 
HYPOTHESIS II-b: The probability of takeover completion will decrease if the target is 
involved in a litigation lawsuit after the takeover announcement. 
According to Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012), the probability of takeover 
completion is lower if the M&A bids are subject to shareholder litigations. Based on their results, 
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we also presume that a litigation lawsuit following a takeover announcement would reduce the 
probability of takeover completion. 
A litigation lawsuit following a takeover announcement gives bidders more information about the 
target and helps them to reconsider their offers. If the expected net benefits decrease after 
reconsideration, bidders may choose to quit. In addition, some firms might dislike dealing with 
the target’s lawsuit uncertainty, and thus may also choose to give up completing this merger 
process.  
 HYPOTHESIS III: The probability of cash payment in a takeover will increase if a target is 
subject to a litigation lawsuit or multiple suits. 
We predict that bidders prefer to make cash payments when the target is involved in a one or 
more litigation lawsuits. Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994) document that lawsuits result in 
wealth loss for affected firms whereas settlements of such litigation produce wealth gain. Thus, 
the post-lawsuit yet pre-settlement period may provide bidders an opportunity to buy an 
undervalued target. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that cash payment has a positive influence on 
takeover success. We propose that if the bidder wants to speed up the takeover process, they may 
prefer to pay in cash. What’s more, Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994) state that lawsuits can 
take a firm into a position of financial distress rather than economic distress.2 Even if the effects 
of litigation lawsuits on revealing asymmetry information remain uncertain, the market reacts 
negatively to the targets. Bidders dislike involving target’s management in their board. To avoid 
changing the existing corporate capital structure, bidders do not choose stock considerations. 
Furthermore, litigations and multiple suits lead to fluctuations in targets’ stock prices (Bhagat, 
Brickley, and Coles, 1994; Gande, and Lewis, 2009). To avoid stock uncertainty, bidders may 
have a higher incentive to pay cash.  
HYPOTHESIS IV: A target earns a higher premium if it has been subject to litigation before an 
M&A announcement. 
A target could be more attractive after litigation and earn a higher premium. Gande and Lewis 
(2009) note a price drop after a litigation announcement. Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994) 
                                                          
2 Wruck (1990) shows that a firm’s leverage in its capital structure can result in financial distress, while poor 
operating behaviors can trigger economic distress. These two distresses usually occur at the same time, but financial 
distress can happen without economic distress. 
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document that lawsuits result in wealth loss and settlements produce wealth gain. This trend 
indicates a firm’s potential undervaluation following a litigation announcement; as such, we 
hypothesize that if investors make a bid after the target’s litigation, they are willing to offer a 
higher price. Moreover, litigation gives bidders a chance to evaluate the target more carefully. If 
they still want to buy the firm after litigation, this shows that bidders value the target more than 
its current price. Targets can be more attractive after lawsuit; as such, bidders tend to compete 
and offer a higher price, which increases the premium. 
IV. Data & Methodology 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our dataset includes firms that are available in the Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly dataset 
between January, 1998 and December, 2014. We match them with the federal securities class 
action lawsuits obtained from SCAC and an M&A dataset that we extract from the SDC U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. The data collection process is as follows: 
First, 668,881 firm-quarter observations are exported from the Compustat Fundamentals 
Quarterly dataset. We also identify 3,614 lawsuits between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 
2014 that meet the following criteria: 
1. U.S. publicly traded firms whose lawsuit filing dates cover the period from January 1, 
1998 to December 31, 2014. A total of 3614 firms are recorded by SCAC. 
2. In total, 705 privately traded firms, firms with an undermined ticker and firms without 
PERMNO and GVKEY are excluded.  
Second, we obtain our acquisition sample from the SDC: 
1. U.S. firms whose takeover announcement dates cover the period from January 1, 1998 to 
December 31, 2014.  
2. Exclude spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, and repurchases.  
3. Targets are publicly traded firms.  
4. The percent of shares owned after the transaction is greater than 50%.  
5. Remove duplicates. 
6. Remove firms without PERMNO and GVKEY. 
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We also require firms to have annual financial statement information available in Compustat one 
year prior to either the litigation announcement or the acquisition announcement, and their price 
and return data are available in CRSP 42 days prior to the announcement. The final sample 
contains 244,696 firm-quarter observations, and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression for 
predicting target candidacy. Our final sample in this regression contains 2,385 merger 
announcements. Panel B of Table 1 displays the variables used to predict takeover completion 
and cash payment. We finally include 1,429 merger announcements here after incorporating more 
control variables such as acquirers’ characteristics and deal characteristics. The number of 
completed bids is 1,325. Our sample includes 331 cash offers. Panel C of Table 1 focuses on the 
variables used to predict takeover premium. Our final sample contains 1,393 firms in this 
regression.  
In addition, to reduce the outliers’ effect, we follow Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) and 
windsorize variables in the sample at the 1st and 99th percentiles. For variables with high standard 
deviations, such as the market-to-book ratio (Target), the PE ratio (Target), the return on equity 
ratio (ROE) (Target), and the market-to-book ratio (Acquirer), we windsorize them at the 10th and 
90th percentiles. 
Table 2 describes the Pearson correlation coefficients in this paper. Panel A of Table 2 shows the 
Pearson correlation coefficients of variables in predicting takeover target candidacy. Panel B of 
Table 2 presents the coefficients of variables in predicting takeover completion and takeover cash 
payment. Panel C of Table 2 contains the correlation coefficients of variables in the takeover 
premium model. We find no high correlations here since all coefficients are below 0.5. 
4.2 Variable Construction 
4.2.1 Independent Variable Construction 
To test the effects of litigation on M&As, we introduce five independent dummy variables: 
(1) Litigation One Year Prior: Litigation One Year Prior is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a firm has undergone a lawsuit during (-4,-1) quarters prior to the observation period 
(quarter 0), and it is zero otherwise. 
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(2) Litigation Two Year Prior: Litigation Two Year Prior is a dummy variable that equals one 
if a firm has at least one lawsuit in the last two years prior to the observation period, and it 
is zero otherwise. 
(3) Suit Before Announcement: Suit Before Announcement refers to securities class action 
lawsuits. It equals one if a firm has been involved in a lawsuit two years prior to a 
takeover, and it is zero otherwise.  
(4) Suit After Announcement: Suit After Announcement refers to securities class action 
lawsuits, which happens between the takeover announcement date and completion date. It 
equals one if a firm is involved in a lawsuit in the period between the takeover 
announcement and takeover completion, and it is zero otherwise. 
(5) Suit: Suit is a dummy variable that combines both the Suit Before and Suit After 
Announcements. It equals one if a firm is involved in a lawsuit two years prior to a 
takeover announcement or in the period between the takeover announcement and takeover 
completion date, and it is zero otherwise. 
(6) Multiple Suits: Multiple Suits refer to firms involved in more than one lawsuit within the 
last two years prior to the observation period. It equals one if a firm has more than one 
lawsuit within the last two years, and it is zero otherwise. 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable Construction 
(1) Probability of Candidacy: Probability of Candidacy is a dummy variable that measures 
the tender offer a firm receives. It takes the value of one if the firm receives at least one 
tender offer, and it is zero otherwise. 
(2) Probability of Completion: Probability of Completion is a dummy variable that measures 
whether the takeover is completed or not. It equals one if the firm completes its takeover 
process, and it is zero otherwise. 
(3) All Cash: Following Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, and Thorburn (2014), All Cash is a 
dummy that equals one if the consideration in the SDC is cash only, and it is zero otherwise. 
      (4) Premium (Combined): We apply Officer’s (2003) methodology to calculate takeover 
premium and exclude outliers. Following his definition, the target premium is calculated as 
{(Bidder’s offer/Target’s pre-bid market value of equity) – 1}. Three methods are used to 
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calculate a bidder’s offer. First, we use the component data, where the SDC records each 
transaction value offered by the bidder. Second, we use the price data. The SDC reports initial 
offer prices per target share and outstanding target shares. Third, the price data are also used and 
we choose final offer prices per target share. To measure target’s pre-bid market value of equity, 
we find the target’s market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the bid announcement. Then, a fourth 
measurement, the combined premium, is used to exclude the extreme positive and negative 
outliers resulting from previous measures. The combined premium depends on both the 
component and price data. If the component data are between 0 and 2, we define the combined 
premium as equal to the component data; if not, the combined premium relies on the initial price 
data (or the final price data if the initial price data is unavailable), which is also between 0 and 2. 
We exclude firms whose premium falls outside of the range [0, 2], similar of Officer (2003). The 
author finds that most of premiums lie in this range and it’s a good way to exclude troubling 
outliers. Only the combined premium is used in our paper. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables, we need to control other variables that can affect 
takeover candidacy, completion, payment, and premium to draw reliable inferences. We consider 
firm characteristics, including a firm’s previous mergers, size, market-to-book ratio, leverage 
ratio, cash ratio, sales growth, PE ratio, ROE ratio, financial situation dummy, which is based on 
the Altman Z-score, share turnover, price change, price run-up, the relative size between the 
target and the bidder, and deal characteristics, such as the number of bidders, industry surprise 
dummy, horizontal dummy, hostile dummy, all cash dummy, all stock dummy, and cross border 
dummy. Definitions of all control variables are shown in Appendix A. Moreover, the 
hypothesized signs of control variables are shown in Appendix B. 
4.3 Methodology 
As in Palepu (1986) and Brar et al. (2009), we employ a logistic regression model to examine 
whether prior litigation against a firm and its other characteristics affect the takeover candidacy 
likelihood, the acquisition completion likelihood, and the takeover payment method as follows: 
Prob (i,t) = [ 1+ exp(-Ｘ’β)]-1 
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where Prob (i,t)  means the probability that firm i will receive at least one tender offer at time t, the 
probability that the acquisition of firm i at time t will complete, and the probability firm i will 
receive a cash offer at time t, respectively. Ｘ’ is a vector of independent variables, and β is a 
vector of unknown parameters. In addition, we define Ｘ’β as follows: 
To predict takeover target candidacy, 
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Litigation One Year Prior +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=2   
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Litigation Two Year Prior +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=2   
To predict takeover completion, 
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Suit Before Announcement + β2 Multiple Suits +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=3  
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Suit After Announcement + β2 Multiple Suits +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=3  




To predict takeover cash payment, 
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Suit Before Announcement +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=2  
Ｘ’β = β0 + β1Suit Before Announcement + β2 Multiple Suits +∑ β𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=3  
where,  𝑥𝑚𝑖 is a vector of the explanatory variables mentioned in 4.2. 
Then, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test whether the variables Suit Before 
Announcement, Suit After Announcement, Suit, and Multiple Suits can affect takeover premium. 
Since premium measures in the SDC result in outlier problem, we follow Officer’s (2003) 
methodology and compute a composite premium to eliminate any extreme effect. 
A panel data regression for predicting takeover premiums is as follows: 
Premium (Combined) = β0 + β1x1 + β2 Multiple Suits +∑ β𝑚x𝑚𝑖
𝑚
𝑚=3  + εi 
where the dependent variable is takeover premium, a composite premium calculated using 
Officer’s (2002) methodology. x1 is Suit Before Announcement, Suit After Announcement, and 
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Suit, respectively. x𝑚𝑖 is a vector of the explanatory variables, including the target, bidder, and 
deal characteristics.  
V. Results 
5.1 Effects of Litigation on Predicting Takeover Target Candidacy 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for three different versions of the takeover target 
candidacy prediction model, and p-values are shown in parentheses. Model 1 includes all the 
control variables, model 2 incorporates the independent variable Litigation One Year Prior, and 
model 3 includes Litigation Two Year Prior based on model 2. Control variables that influence 
the likelihood of takeover candidacy are a firm’s size, its market-to-book ratio, PE ratio, industry 
surprise dummy, financial situation dummy, share turnover, and last year’s price return. Model 1 
in Table 3 shows that a small firm’s asset size (p<.0001), low market-to-book ratio (p=0.0005), 
high PE ratio (p=0.0029), more industry merger surprise (p<.0001), having been in financial 
distress (p<0.0001), high share turnover (p<0.0001), and its small stock return (p<0.0001) can 
help predict target candidacy. 
The above result remains unchanged when the variable Litigation One Year Prior is included in 
model 2 (Table 3). There is a positive relationship between a firm’s likelihood of target 
candidacy and the firm’s prior litigation lawsuits, but the result is statistically insignificant, 
indicating that litigation is not a key determinant predicting takeover candidacy. This is 
reasonable since fluctuations in a firm’s stock price could incorporate this information and result 
in its insignificance. As our results demonstrate, the negative reaction in the stock market 
positively associates with the probability of being a target. 
Based on model 2 in Table 3, we include the variable Litigation Two Year Prior in model 3. The 
sign and significance of all the above variables remain consistent. The coefficient of Litigation 
Two Year Prior shows a positive and significant sign, which suggests that suits within the last 
two years relates to the probability of a firm becoming a target. We believe that lawsuits result in 
the market’s overreaction and a firm’s undervaluation; in this way, investors may think a firm is a 




5.2 Effects of Litigation on Takeover Completion 
Table 4 depicts the estimation results for three different versions of the model predicting takeover 
completion, and p-values are shown in parentheses. Model 1 includes Suit Before Announcement, 
Multiple Suits, and all firm and deal characteristic variables. Only the target’s financial situation 
dummy, which indicates its financial problems (p=0.0798), the target’s low share turnover 
(p=0.055), and the acquirer’s low leverage ratio (p=0.052) predict takeover completion in our 
model. None of them is significant below the 5% level. Less obvious significance or 
insignificance of the control variables can be expected, as investors may have thought about this 
information before they made a bid. Moreover, neither Suit Before Announcement nor Multiple 
Suits help to predict takeover completion. We think this is reasonable, as investors have already 
considered these before they enacted their investment strategies. We also believe that if no major 
news is announced when the merger announcement is pending, a firm’s status would be relatively 
stable, and investors would be unlikely to change their decisions. 
In model 2 (Table 4), we use Suit After Announcement to replace the variable Suit Before 
Announcement to examine the litigation effect in the post-bid period. Suit After Announcement 
has a significant negative relationship with takeover completion, which means that the 
probability of takeover completion decreases if the target is involved in a lawsuit between the 
takeover announcement date and the takeover effective date. This confirms our hypothesis. A 
litigation lawsuit following a takeover announcement gives investors a chance to reconsider their 
offer; they may find out that the expected net benefits will decrease after this litigation lawsuit, 
and thus they often lose their interest in the target. In addition, the target can be less attractive if 
investors dislike dealing with its lawsuit uncertainty. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012). 
Model 3 in Table 4 presents the estimation results including all variables, including Suit Before 
Announcement, Suit After Announcement, and Multiple Suits. After adding Suit Before 
Announcement, the negative and significant relationship between Suit After Announcement and 
the probability of takeover completion remains unaltered, which reinforces our previous finding. 
Suit Before Announcement and Multiple Suits still enter into the regression insignificantly, 
showing their insignificant effect on predicting takeover completion. 
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5.3 Effects of Litigation on Predicting Takeover Payment 
Table 5 details the effects of litigation on predicting takeover all-cash payment. Model 1 includes 
both firm and deal characteristic variables; model 2 includes Suit Before Announcement to test 
the effects of litigation; and in model 3, the variable Multiple Suits is entered into the regression.  
Model 1 in Table 5 reports that the firm characteristics that predict cash payment are small firm 
size (p<0.0001), the target’s low market-to-book ratio (p=0.0002), the target’s low leverage ratio 
(p=0.0557), the target’s low sales growth (p=0.0241), the target’s price change in the run-up 
period (p=0.0713), and the relative size between the target and the acquirer (p<0.0001). It also 
shows that deal characteristics, including the number of bidders (p=0.0954), the target’s industry 
surprise dummy (p=0.0446), a horizontal merger dummy (p=0.0275), and a dummy indicating 
the merger is cross border (p=0.0417) predict takeover all-cash payment as well. 
The above variables’ sign and significance remain unaltered after the variable Suit Before 
Announcement enters into the regression model 2. The positive coefficient of Suit Before 
Announcement suggests that investors tend to prefer cash payment if the target is involved in a 
litigation lawsuit prior to the takeover announcement, which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
However, this result is statistically insignificant. One potential reason is that since the target’s 
price change in the run-up period is much closer to the takeover announcement date and it could 
incorporate this news, investors do not further consider the litigation effect when determining the 
payment method. 
In model 3, we include the variable Multiple Suits. The significance of all control variables still 
remains unaltered. The coefficient of Multiple Suits is also positive and statistically insignificant. 
Neither Suit Before Announcement nor Multiple Suits is the determinant predicting takeover cash 
payment. 
5.4 Determinants of Takeover Premiums 
Table 6 presents the results for the models predicting takeover premiums. There are four different 
versions we use. Model 1 uses the variable Suit to assess whether a litigation lawsuit is a 
determinant of takeover premiums; model 2 separates Suit into Suit Before Announcement and 
Suit After Announcement to test the litigation effect in different periods; model 3 only includes 
Suit Before Announcement, and model 4 only uses Suit After Announcement. From model 1, we 
find that the control variables, a target’s previous mergers, a target’s firm size, a target’s market-
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to-book ratio, a target’s leverage ratio, a target’s sales growth rate, the relative size between the 
target and the acquirer, the number of bidders, the hostile takeover dummy, and the all-cash 
payment dummy are the determinants of takeover premiums. More previous mergers of a target, 
a target’s larger size, the target’s high market-to-book ratio, a target’s low leverage ratio, a 
target’s small sales growth rate, a considerable difference in relative size, a small number of 
bidders, a friendly takeover, and cash payment can reduce the takeover premium. The coefficient 
of the variable Suit is positive and statistically significant in model 1. It shows that if the target is 
involved in a litigation lawsuit prior to the completion of the takeover, its premium could 
increase around 10%. As mentioned previously, litigation can lead to low stock price returns, and 
investors are willing to pay more since they believe the effects of litigation can be relatively 
short-lived and the net benefits of M&A can still be considerable after offering a higher bid. The 
negative coefficient of Multiple Suits shows that investors tend to pay less if the target is involved 
in more than one lawsuit. This makes sense, as Multiple Suits implies that the target has serious 
management problems. However, this result is statistically insignificant. 
In model 2 (Table 6), Suit Before Announcement and Suit After Announcement represent litigation 
lawsuits in different periods. The sign and significance of all the above control variables remain 
unaltered. The results show that a litigation lawsuit occurring prior to a takeover announcement 
has a positive and significant effect on takeover premiums; however, such a lawsuit between the 
takeover announcement and the takeover effective date is not a determinant of takeover 
premiums. This insignificant result of Suit After Announcement does not support the findings of 
Thompson and Thomas (2004) and Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012) indicating 
a positive relationship between acquisition-oriented suits and takeover premium. Since 
acquisition-oriented suits are only a small portion of all litigation types and our model does not 
distinguish between allegation types, we believe that suits other than acquisition-oriented ones 
may be one of the reasons for the insignificant results in our finding. Moreover, the Multiple Suits 
result remains insignificant in this model. 
Model 3 drops Suit After Announcement. We still find that Suit Before Announcement positively 
and significantly relates to takeover premiums, which reinforces our previous finding. Model 4 
includes Suit After Announcement only. The insignificant result shows that it is not a key 




Our results shed light on the effects of litigation on M&A. Besides integrating celebrated 
empirical studies, in this paper we explore the role of litigation in the M&A field using a large 
and complete sample of shareholder class action lawsuits from 1998 to 2014 recorded by SCAC. 
Our results indicate that even if litigation within the last year is not a key determinant predicting 
takeover candidacy, suits within the last two years are positively related to a firm’s likelihood of 
becoming a target. This result confirms our thinking about market overreaction. Suits within the 
last two years potentially indicate that a firm is undervalued by the market and is a good 
candidate for purchase. Another potential explanation is that the manage boards of defendant 
firms dislike the uncertainty caused by multiple suits, so they undervalue their firms voluntary to 
attract buyers and to get out of business. We also find several publically available information, 
such as a firm’s size, its market-to-book ratio, PE ratio, industry surprise dummy, financial 
situation dummy, share turnover, and last year’s price return, play a role in predicting takeover 
candidacy. 
Our findings highlight that once the bid is announced, investors rarely make substantial changes 
based on past known information. In this process, neither a litigation lawsuit prior to the takeover 
announcement nor multiple suits will affect the probability of takeover completion. In addition, 
our results indicate that investors adjust their investment strategies based on new incoming 
information since the probability of takeover completion decreases when the target is involved in 
at least one litigation lawsuit in the post-bid period. This result is also consistent with the findings 
of Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (2012) showing that acquisition-oriented lawsuits 
prohibit the completion of a takeover. Exploring the effects of litigation by separating lawsuit 
types remains a topic for future study. 
To predict takeover cash payment by incorporating firm characteristics and deal characteristics, 
we find that several types of firm information, such as the firm’s size, its market-to-book ratio, its 
sales growth rate, its price change in the run-up period,  and the relative size between the target 
and the bidder help predict cash offers. Deal characteristics such as cross-border deals also play 
an important role. This result is consistent with Faccio and Masulis (2005). We did not find a 
significant effect of litigation on predicting cash offers. This indicates that litigation is not an 
important consideration when investors determine their takeover payment method. Moreover, our 
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results show that litigation before an M&A announcement has a positive effect on takeover 
premiums. This confirms our thinking that there is a potential undervaluation after the firm’s 
litigation. 
In this paper, we first used a large and complete sample of shareholder class action lawsuits to 
explore the effects of litigation on M&As. To conclude, we found that litigation does impact the 
M&A process. Our results can be used to remind investors of the importance of considering 
potential litigation effects before making investment decisions. 
VII. Limitations 
One potential future prospect is to specify different lawsuit types and test their effect on M&A 
activities. Separating lawsuits by their settlement status may also give us a better understanding 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression models. In each panel, we provide the 
number of observations, as well as the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value of each variable. Panel A 
focuses on the variables used to predict takeover candidacy, Panel B displays the variables used to predict takeover 
completion and cash payment, while Panel C focuses on the variables used to predict takeover premiums. All variable 
definitions are contained in Appendix A. 
Panel A         
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Firm Characteristics         
Previous Mergers 0.0113 0.1097 0 3 
Log of Assets 2.6409 0.9596 0.68842 5.07221 
Market to Book Ratio 2.3275 1.5626 0.67339 5.6455 
Leverage 0.1804 0.2086 0 4.39409 
Sales Growth 0.1123 0.2306 -0.21841 0.56674 
PE Ratio 45.9730 61.0326 -52.25 153.30769 
ROE 0.0113 0.0496 -0.09744 0.07397 
Financial Situation 0.5359 0.4987 0 1 
Share Turnover 0.3761 0.4258 0.00671 2.36749 
Industry Surprise 0.6487 0.4774 0 1 
Return One Year Prior 0.0387 0.8287 -2.94937 3.8897 
Litigation One Year Prior 0.0249 0.1558 0 1 
Litigation Two Year Prior 0.0004 0.0209 0 1 
No. of Observations 244696       
Number of Merger Announcements 2385       
          
Panel B   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Firm Characteristics         
Previous Mergers (Target) 0.0105 0.1086 0 2 
Log of Assets (Target) 2.4083 0.7734 -0.0462 4.7525 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) 2.6013 1.7146 0.7333 6.1312 
Leverage (Target) 0.1628 0.2133 0 1.7217 
Cash Ratio (Target) 0.167 0.1768 0 0.9336 
Sales Growth (Target) 0.2683 0.8886 -1.0656 15.8664 
PE Ratio (Target) 10.6844 19.7479 -19.1429 46.7717 
ROE (Target) -0.0232 0.3963 -0.8709 0.596 
Financial Situation (Target) 0.4234 0.4943 0 1 
Share Turnover (Target) 1.9494 1.7981 0.0742 9.1884 
Price Change (Target) -0.0081 0.1721 -0.976 3.8505 
Run Up (Target) -0.4174 0.5819 -4.2632 2.6585 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) 3.4081 2.2086 1.0938 8.0407 
Leverage (Acquirer) 0.1795 0.1844 0 2.0691 
Relative Size 0.3291 0.5064 0.0007 2.9402 
Suit Before Announcements 0.0609 0.2392 0 1 
Suit After Announcements 0.0266 0.1609 0 1 
Multiple Suits 0.0084 0.0913 0 1 
Deal Characteristics         
Number of Bidders 1.0525 0.2553 1 4 
Industry Surprise (Target) 0.7607 0.4268 0 1 
Horizontal 0.4283 0.495 0 1 
Hostile 0.0063 0.0791 0 1 
All Stock 0.1428 0.35 0 1 
Cross Border 0.1267 0.3327 0 1 
No. of Observations 14293       
Number of Completed Bids 1325       
Number of Cash Offers 331       
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Panel C         
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Firm Characteristics         
Previous Mergers (Target) 0.0072 0.0845 0 1 
Log of Assets (Target) 2.4085 0.777 -0.0462 4.7525 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) 2.6182 1.7121 0.7333 6.1312 
Leverage (Target) 0.1597 0.2104 0 1.7217 
Cash Ratio (Target) 0.1679 0.1781 0 0.9336 
Sales Growth (Target) 0.2687 0.8964 -1.0656 15.8664 
PE Ratio (Target) 10.563 19.668 -19.1429 46.7717 
ROE (Target) -0.0259 0.3863 -0.8709 0.596 
Financial Situation (Target) 0.42 0.4937 0 1 
Share Turnover (Target) 1.9716 1.7937 0.0742 9.1884 
Price Change (Target) -0.0078 0.1736 -0.976 3.8505 
Run Up (Target) -0.4261 0.5808 -4.2632 2.6585 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) 3.4397 2.2126 1.0938 8.0407 
Leverage (Acquirer) 0.1777 0.1841 0 2.0691 
Relative Size 0.3301 0.5097 0.0007 2.9402 
Suit Before Announcements 0.061 0.2395 0 1 
Suit After Announcements 0.0273 0.163 0 1 
Multiple Suits 0.0086 0.0925 0 1 
Deal Characteristics         
Number of Bidders 1.0538 0.2584 1 4 
Industry Surprise (Target) 0.7581 0.4284 0 1 
Horizontal 0.43 0.4953 0 1 
Hostile 0.005 0.0707 0 1 
All Cash 0.2261 0.4185 0 1 
All Stock 0.1436 0.3508 0 1 
No. of Observations 1393       





Table 2 Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A                           
This table contains Pearson correlation coefficients for a sample of 244,696 observations between 1998 and 2014. Variables are (1)Probability of Candidacy (2)Previous Mergers (3)Log 
of Assets (4)Market to Book Ratio (5)Leverage Ratio (6)Sales Growth (7)PE ratio (8)Industry Surprise (9)ROE (10) Financial Situation (11)Share Turnover (12) Litigation One Year Prior 
(13) Litigation Two Year Prior (14) Return One Year Prior. All variable definitions are contained in Appendix A. P-values are provided in parentheses. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) 1                           
(2) 0.00 1                         
(3) -0.00 -0.00 1                       
(4) -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 1                     
(5) 0.01 0.02 0.22 -0.08 1                   
(6) 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.02 1                 
(7) 0.00 -0.01 0.21 0.14 -0.05 0.10 1               
(8) 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 1             
(9) 0.00 -0.01 0.30 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.45 -0.06 1           
(10) 0.02 0.03 0.21 -0.34 0.38 -0.11 -0.17 0.09 -0.14 1         
(11) 0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 1       
(12) 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 1     
(13) 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 1   
(14) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 1 





Table 2  Continued 
Panel B                                               
This table contains Pearson correlation coefficients for a sample of 1,429 observations between 1998 and 2014. Variables are (1)Probability of Completion (2)All Cash (3)Previous Mergers (Target) (4)Log 
of Assets (Target) (5)Market to Book Ratio (Target) (6)Leverage Ratio (Target) (7)Cash Ratio (Target) (8)Sales Growth (Target) (9)PE Ratio (Target) (10)ROE (Target) (11)Financial Situation (Target) 
(12)Share Turnover (Target) (13)Price Change (Target) (14)Run Up (Target) (15)Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) (16)Leverage (Acquirer) (17)Relative Size (18)Suit Before Announcement (19) Suit After 
Announcement (20) Multiple Suits (21)Number of Bidders (22)Industry Surprise (Target) (23)Horizontal (24)Hostile (25)All Stock. All variable definitions are contained in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) 1                                                 
(2) -0.01 1                                               
(3) 0.03 0.01 1                                             
(4) -0.04 -0.24 -0.01 1                                           
(5) -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 1                                         
(6) 0.03 -0.13 0.05 0.34 -0.05 1                                       
(7) 0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.39 0.18 -0.33 1                                     
(8) 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 0.02 0.06 1                                   
(9) -0.01 -0.06 -0.00 0.22 0.09 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 1                                 
(10) -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.33 0.01 0.09 -0.23 -0.05 0.45 1                               
(11) 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.31 0.05 0.01 -0.29 -0.33 1                             
(12) -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.27 0.19 -0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.10 1                           
(13) 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.10 1                         
(14) 0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.00 1                       
(15) 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.34 -0.10 0.18 0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.04 1                     
(16) -0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.05 0.34 -0.22 -0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.07 -0.00 -0.05 1                   
(17) -0.02 -0.18 0.04 0.27 -0.13 0.12 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.07 1                 
(18) 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.00 0.21 -0.19 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 1               
(19) -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.01 1             
(20) -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.10 0.13 1           
(21) -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.02 -0.02 1         
(22) -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.11 0.15 -0.08 0.22 0.06 -0.05 -0.10 0.11 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.02 -0.05 1       
(23) -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.11 1     
(24) 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 1   
(25) 0.01 -0.22 0.02 -0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.11 0.14 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 -0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 1 





Table 2  Continued 
Panel C 
This table contains Pearson correlation coefficients for a sample of 1,393 observations between 1998 and 2014. Variables are (1)Premium (Combined) (2)Previous Mergers (Target) (3)Industry Surprise (Target) 
(4)Horizontal (5)Hostile (6)Number of Bidders (7)All Stock (8)All Cash (9)Log of Assets (Target) (10)Market to Book Ratio (Target) (11)Cash Ratio (Target) (12)Leverage Ratio (Target) (13)PE Ratio (Target) 
(14)ROE (Target) (15)Share Turnover (Target) (16)Sales Growth (Target) (17)Relative Size (18)Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) (19)Leverage Ratio (Acquirer) (20)Run up (Target) (21)Price Change (Target) 
(22)Financial Situation (Target) (23)Suit Before Announcement (24)Suit After Announcement (25)Suit (26)Multiple Suits. All variable definitions are contained in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(1) 1                                                   
(2) -0.04 1                                                 
(3) 0.02 -0.01 1                                               
(4) -0.01 -0.02 0.11 1                                             
(5) 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.02 1                                           
(6) 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 1                                         
(7) 0.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 1                                       
(8) -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.22 1                                     
(9) -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.16 -0.24 1                                   
(10) -0.05 -0.02 0.15 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 1                                 
(11) -0.02 0.03  0.22 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.08 -0.40 0.18 1                               
(12) 0.16 -0.01 -0.09 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.07 -0.14 0.35 -0.04 -0.34 1                             
(13) -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.23 0.08 -0.15 -0.03 1                           
(14) -0.05 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.33 0.01 -0.24 0.12 0.44 1                         
(15) -0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.27 0.19 0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.07 1                       
(16) 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.10 1                     
(17) -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.11 -0.17 0.27 -0.13 -0.14 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.01 1                   
(18) 0.01 -0.00 0.17 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.04 -0.10 0.34 0.19 -0.09 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.13 -0.04 1                 
(19) 0.07 0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 0.20 -0.05 -0.22 0.33 0.08 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 0.08 -0.04 1               
(20) -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.00 1             
(21) 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.01 1           
(22) 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.05 0.30 -0.29 -0.33 -0.10 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.11 0.06 0.01 1         
(23) 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.22 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.01 1       
(24) -0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01 1     
(25) 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.23 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15 0.01 0.83 0.55 1   
(26) -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.11 0.13 0.11 1 
The bold text indicates that the significance level is less than 1%. 
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Table 3 Logistic Regression for Predicting Target Candidacy 
This table provides the results for predicting takeover target candidacy. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Dependent variable is 
Probability of Candidacy; independent variables are Previous Mergers, Log of Assets, Market to 
Book Ratio, Leverage, Sales Growth, PE Ratio, Industry Surprise, ROE, Financial Situation, 
Share Turnover, Return One Year Prior, Litigation One Year Prior, and Litigation Two Year 
Prior. All variable definitions are contained in Appendix A. P-values are provided in parentheses.   
 
Parameter Model One Model Two Model Three 
Intercept -4.9953*** -4.9925*** -4.9879*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Previous Mergers 0.111 0.1102 0.1113 
 (0.5059) (0.5089) (0.5049) 
Log of Assets -0.0997*** -0.101*** -0.1029*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Market to Book Ratio -0.0528*** -0.053*** -0.0533*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Leverage 0.1296 0.1291 0.1297 
 (0.19) (0.1917) (0.1895) 
Sales Growth -0.0631 -0.0639 -0.063 
 (0.4956) (0.4896) (0.4963) 
PE Ratio 0.00113*** 0.00114*** 0.00114*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Industry Surprise 0.4533*** 0.4528*** 0.4528*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROE 0.7085 0.7205 0.7245 
 (0.1439) (0.1373) (0.1351) 
Financial Situation 0.3973*** 0.3981*** 0.3983*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Share Turnover 0.3246*** 0.3193*** 0.3185*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Return One Year Prior -0.1221*** -0.1214*** -0.1211*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Litigation One Year Prior - 0.1039 0.0882 
 - (0.4034) (0.4797) 
Litigation Two Year Prior - - 1.3599*** 
 - - (0.0082) 
Number of Obs. 244696 244696 244696 





Table 4 Logistic Regression for Predicting Takeover Completion 
This table provides the results for predicting takeover completion. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Dependent variable is Probability of 
Completion; independent variables are Previous Mergers (Target), Log of Assets (Target), Market 
to Book Ratio (Target), Leverage (Target), Cash Ratio (Target), Sales Growth (Target), PE Ratio 
(Target), ROE (Target), Financial Situation (Target), Share Turnover (Target), Price Change 
(Target), Run Up (Target), Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer), Leverage (Acquirer), Relative Size, 
Suit Before Announcement, Suit After Announcement, Multiple Suits, Number of Bidders, Industry 
Surprise (Target), Horizontal, Hostile, All Stock, and All Cash. All variable definitions are 
contained in Appendix A. P-values are provided in parentheses. 
 
Parameter Model One Model Two Model Three 
Intercept 3.2587*** 3.2039*** 3.233*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Firm Characteristics       
Previous Mergers (Target) 13.4961 13.5334 13.5659 
(0.9882) (0.9876) (0.9874) 
Log of Assets (Target) -0.154 -0.1151 -0.1216 
(0.3908) (0.5243) (0.4996) 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) -0.0498 -0.0472 -0.0526 
(0.4761) (0.5) (0.4534) 
Leverage (Target) 0.9628 0.8862 0.9427 
(0.1809) (0.2153) (0.1907) 
Cash Ratio (Target) 0.2463 0.2567 0.2484 
(0.7364) (0.7268) (0.7346) 
Sales Growth (Target) 0.1169 0.1039 0.1203 
(0.5002) (0.5412) (0.4857) 
PE Ratio (Target) 0.00482 0.0044 0.00501 
(0.4304) (0.4683) (0.4126) 
ROE (Target) -0.0851 -0.1297 -0.1073 
(0.8071) (0.711) (0.7584) 
Financial Situation (Target) 0.4521* 0.4556* 0.4633* 
(0.0798) (0.0777) (0.0736) 
Share Turnover (Target) -0.1097* -0.0888 -0.104* 
(0.055) (0.1155) (0.0695) 
Price Change (Target) 0.5687 0.1491 0.5976 
(0.5615) (0.8148) (0.5487) 
Run Up (Target) 0.0271 0.0188 0.0227 
(0.8806) (0.9171) (0.9001) 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) 0.0315 0.027 0.0285 
(0.5481) (0.6055) (0.5875) 
Leverage(Acquirer) -1.0884* -1.0112* -1.0963** 
(0.052) (0.0621) (0.0493) 
Relative Size -0.1768 -0.1782 -0.1889 
(0.3922) (0.3865) (0.3609) 
Suit Before Announcement 0.7566 - 0.7517 
(0.1818) - (0.188) 
Suit After Announcement - -0.8955* -0.885* 
- (0.0638) (0.0672) 
Multiple Suits -0.1974 0.2411 0.0131 






Table 4 Continued 
 
      
Parameter Model One Model Two Model Three 
Deal Characteristics       
Number of Bidders 0.0386 0.0348 0.0392 
(0.9223) (0.9301) (0.9216) 
Industry Surprise (Target) -0.1869 -0.1944 -0.2086 
(0.4726) (0.4564) (0.4249) 
Horizontal -0.2872 -0.288 -0.2879 
(0.1739) (0.1736) (0.1741) 
Hostile 13.7062 13.6529 13.6759 
(0.9909) (0.9909) (0.9909) 
All Stock 0.0741 0.0572 0.074 
(0.8261) (0.8657) (0.8269) 
All Cash -0.2507 -0.2499 -0.2551 
(0.3406) (0.343) (0.3332) 
Number of Obs. 1429 1429 1429 
Pseudo R-squared 3.35% 3.45% 3.74% 
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Table 5  Logistic Regression for Predicting Cash Payment 
This table provides the results for predicting cash payments in takeovers. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Dependent variable is All 
Cash; independent variables are Previous Mergers (Target), Log of Assets (Target), Market to 
Book Ratio (Target), Leverage (Target), Cash Ratio (Target), Sales Growth (Target), PE Ratio 
(Target), ROE (Target), Financial Situation (Target), Share Turnover (Target), Price Change 
(Target), Run Up (Target), Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer), Leverage (Acquirer), Relative Size, 
Suit Before Announcement, Multiple Suits, Number of Bidders, Industry Surprise (Target), 
Horizontal, Hostile, and Cross Border. All variable definitions are contained in Appendix A. P-
values are provided in parentheses. 
 
Parameter Model One Model Two Model Three 
Intercept 0.7804* 0.7902* 0.7898* 
  (0.0685) (0.0657) (0.0658) 
Firm Characteristics       
Previous Mergers (Target) 0.0432 0.0479 0.0488 
(0.9428) (0.9366) (0.9354) 
Log of Assets (Target) -0.6779*** -0.6806*** -0.6833*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) -0.168*** -0.1682*** -0.1675*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Leverage (Target) -0.7883* -0.7817* -0.7771* 
(0.0557) (0.0579) (0.0595) 
Cash Ratio (Target) -0.6886 -0.6874 -0.69 
(0.1012) (0.1019) (0.1007) 
Sales Growth (Target) -0.2936** -0.2894** -0.2896** 
(0.0241) (0.0262) (0.026) 
PE Ratio (Target) -0.00249 -0.00242 -0.0024 
(0.5274) (0.5404) (0.5365) 
ROE (Target) 0.0836 0.0895 0.0902 
(0.6788) (0.6583) (0.656) 
Financial Situation (Target) -0.0192 -0.0188 -0.0205 
(0.9059) (0.9081) (0.8996) 
Share Turnover (Target) 0.00825 0.00453 0.0043 
(0.8525) (0.9199) (0.9244) 
Price Change (Target) 0.1638 0.2131 0.2112 
(0.6933) (0.6016) (0.6059) 
Run Up (Target) 0.2065* 0.2069* 0.2056* 
(0.0713) (0.0707) (0.0726) 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) 0.0342 0.0339 0.0343 
(0.2926) (0.2968) (0.2925) 
Leverage (Acquirer) -0.7324 -0.7291 -0.7262 
(0.1068) (0.1078) (0.1093) 
Relative Size -1.156*** -1.1527*** -1.1523*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Suit Before Announcement - 0.1444 0.1362 
- (0.6221) (0.6434) 
Multiple Suits - - 0.2718 





Table 5 Continued 
 
      
Parameter Model One Model Two Model Three 
Deal Characteristics       
Number of Bidders 0.4594* 0.455* 0.4575* 
(0.0954) (0.0992) (0.0974) 
Industry Surprise (Target) 0.3471** 0.3443** 0.3425** 
(0.0446) (0.0465) (0.0478) 
Horizontal -0.3124** -0.3135** -0.3114** 
(0.0275) (0.027) (0.0282) 
Hostile -0.8328 -0.8251 -0.8227 
(0.4599) (0.4641) (0.4654) 
Cross Border 0.3884** 0.3849** 0.3862** 
(0.0417) (0.0439) (0.0432) 
Number of Obs. 1429 1429 1429 
Pseudo R-squared 11.43% 11.44% 11.45% 
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Table 6 OLS Regression for Predicting Takeover Premiums 
This table provides the results for predicting the determinants of takeover premiums. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Dependent variable is Premium 
(Combined); independent variables are Previous Mergers (Target), Log of Assets (Target), Market to 
Book Ratio (Target), Leverage (Target), Cash Ratio (Target), Sales Growth (Target), PE Ratio 
(Target), ROE (Target), Financial Situation (Target), Share Turnover (Target), Price Change 
(Target), Run Up (Target), Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer), Leverage (Acquirer), Relative Size, Suit 
Before Announcement, Suit After Announcement, Suit, Multiple Suits, Number of Bidders, Industry 
Surprise (Target), Horizontal, Hostile, All Stock, and All Cash. All variable definitions are contained 
in Appendix A. P-values are provided in parentheses. 
 
Variable Model One  Model Two Model Three Model Four 
Intercept 0.6263*** 0.6268*** 0.6263*** 0.6207*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Firm Characteristics         
Previous Mergers (Target) -0.2563* -0.2490* -0.2459* -0.2548* 
(0.0544) (0.062) (0.0649) (0.0566) 
Log of Assets (Target) -0.0828*** -0.0816*** -0.0808*** -0.0803*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) -0.0195*** -0.0198*** -0.0199*** -0.0197*** 
(0.0071) (0.0064) (0.006) (0.0068) 
Leverage (Target) 0.3438*** 0.3436*** 0.3431*** 0.3362*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Cash Ratio (Target) -0.0266 -0.0267 -0.0268 -0.0274 
(0.7176) (0.7171) (0.7155) (0.71) 
Sales Growth (Target) 0.0314** 0.0320** 0.0322** 0.0303** 
(0.0136) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0174) 
PE Ratio (Target) -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 
(0.1812) (0.1871) (0.1861) (0.1459) 
ROE (Target) 0.0088 0.0094 0.0092 0.0041 
(0.8009) (0.7863) (0.7927) (0.9068) 
Financial Situation (Target) 0.043 0.0445* 0.0450* 0.0435* 
(0.1024) (0.091) (0.0876) (0.0995) 
Share Turnover (Target) -0.002 -0.0021 -0.0019 0.0011 
(0.7786) (0.7622) (0.7867) (0.8754) 
Price Change (Target) 0.088 0.0936 0.0939 0.0689 
(0.1784) (0.1542) (0.1528) (0.2897) 
Run Up (Target) -0.0136 -0.0136 -0.0138 -0.0143 
(0.4774) (0.4776) (0.473) (0.4565) 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) 0.0078 0.0077 0.0076 0.0079 
(0.1564) (0.1635) (0.1674) (0.1553) 
Leverage (Acquirer) 0.0895 0.086 0.0847 0.0917 
(0.1725) (0.1903) (0.1965) (0.1633) 
Relative Size -0.0571** -0.0571** -0.0572** -0.0569** 












  Table 6 Continued 
 
        
Variable Model One  Model Two Model Three Model Four 
Suit Before Announcement - 0.1251*** 0.1247** - 
- (0.0099) (0.0101) - 
Suit After Announcement - 0.0338 - 0.0309 
- (0.6257) - (0.6568) 
Suit 0.1032** - - - 
(0.0125) - - - 
Multiple Suits -0.1076 -0.1156 -0.1088 -0.0861 
(0.3731) (0.3418) (0.3677) (0.4778) 
Deal Characteristics         
Number of Bidders 0.1329*** 0.1327*** 0.1326*** 0.1347*** 
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.002) 
Industry Surprise (Target) 0.0267 0.0252 0.0247 0.0280 
(0.328) (0.358) (0.3673) (0.3073) 
Horizontal -0.0182 -0.0182 -0.0183 -0.0173 
(0.4282) (0.4278) (0.4259) (0.4504) 
Hostile 0.387** 0.3858** 0.3845** 0.3784** 
(0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0175) 
All Stock -0.0286 -0.0287 -0.0288 -0.0309 
(0.4067) (0.4053) (0.402) (0.3708) 
All Cash -0.0846*** -0.0851*** -0.0851*** -0.0840*** 
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0037) 
Number of Obs. 1393 1393 1393 1393 






Independent Variables Description 
Litigation One Year Prior 
 
Litigation One Year Prior is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has 
undergone a lawsuit during (-4,-1) quarters prior to the observation period (quarter 
0), and it is zero otherwise. 
Litigation Two Year Prior 
Litigation Two Year Prior is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has at least 
one lawsuit in the last two years prior to the observation period, and it is zero 
otherwise. 
Suit Before Announcement 
 
Suit Before Announcement refers to securities class action lawsuits. It equals one if 
a firm has been involved in a lawsuit two years prior to a takeover, and it is zero 
otherwise. 
Suit After Announcement 
 
 
Suit After Announcement refers to securities class action lawsuits, which happens 
between the takeover announcement date and completion date. It equals one if a 
firm is involved in a lawsuit in the period between the takeover announcement and 




Suit is a dummy variable that combines both the Suit Before and Suit After 
Announcements. It equals one if a firm is involved in a lawsuit two years prior to a 
takeover announcement or in the period between the takeover announcement and 
takeover completion date, and it is zero otherwise. 
Multiple Suits 
Multiple Suits refer to firms involved in more than one lawsuit within the last two 
years prior to the observation period. It equals one if a firm has more than one 
lawsuit within the last two years, and it is zero otherwise. 
 
 
Dependent Variables Description 
Probability of Candidacy 
 
Probability of Candidacy is a dummy variable that measures the tender offer a firm 
receives. It takes the value of one if the firm receives at least one tender offer, and it 
is zero otherwise. 
Probability of Completion 
 
Probability of Completion is a dummy variable that measures whether the takeover 
is completed or not. It equals one if the firm completes its takeover process, and it 
is zero otherwise. 
All Cash 
 
Following Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, and Thorburn (2014), All Cash is a dummy 










We apply Officer’s (2003) methodology to calculate takeover premium and exclude 
outliers. Following his definition, the target premium is calculated as {(Bidder’s 
offer/Target’s pre-bid market value of equity) – 1}. Three methods are used to 
calculate a bidder’s offer. First, we use the component data, where the SDC records 
each transaction value offered by the bidder. Second, we use the price data. The 
SDC reports initial offer prices per target share and outstanding target shares. Third, 
the price data are also used and we choose final offer prices per target share. To 
measure target’s pre-bid market value of equity, we find the target’s market value 
of equity 4 weeks prior to the bid announcement. Then, a fourth measurement, the 
combined premium, is used to exclude the extreme positive and negative outliers 
resulting from previous measures. The combined premium depends on both the 
component and price data. If the component data are between 0 and 2, we define 
the combined premium as equal to the component data; if not, the combined 
premium relies on the initial price data (or the final price data if the initial price 
data is unavailable), which is also between 0 and 2. We exclude firms whose 
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Control Variables Description 
Previous Mergers (Target) 
As Cornett et al. (2011), previous mergers count for the number of times a firm 
receives a bid in the prior two years. Data source: SDC. 
Log of Assets (Target) 
The logarithm of total book value of a firm’s assets. Firm’s total assets are derived 
from COMPUSTAT. We use the data that at the end of the fiscal year preceding the 
observation year.  The units are millions of dollars. 
Market to Book Ratio 
To be consistent with Palepu (1986) and Davis and Stout (1992), we define market-
to-book ratio as the market value of the common equity of a firm divided by its 
book equity. The annual data on a firm’s market-to-book ratio can be obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. The variable is measured at the fiscal year prior to the observation 
year. Market value (MKVALT), total assets (AT) and total liabilities (LT) are 
exported from COMPUSTAT. MTB = MKVALT/ (AT-LT). We calculate this 
variable for both targets and acquirers. 
Leverage 
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of the long-term debt to the firm’s total assets. 
The sum of a firm's preferred and common equity is its total equity. Leverage ratio 
is measured at the fiscal year prior to the observation year. Firm’s total assets (AT) 
and long-term debt are exported from COMPUSTAT. Leverage is calculated for 
both targets and acquirers. 
Cash Ratio (Target) 
Cash ratio can be used to measure a firm’s liquidity situation. Cash ratio is 
measured as the ratio of cash to total assets. Cash and assets are at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the observation year. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Sales Growth (Target) 
Sales growth is measured as (Salest-1 – Salest-2)/ Salest-2. Observation year is year 
0. Data are at the end of each fiscal year. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
PE Ratio (Target) 
Price-to-earnings (PE) ratio is defined as Stock price/ Earnings per share. Data are 
at the end of the fiscal year preceding the observation year.  Data source: 
COMPUSTAT. 
ROE (Target) 
We use return on equity to measure a firm’s profitability. Return on equity is the 
ratio of net income to shareholder’s equity. Data are at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the observation year. Net income (NI) and shareholder’s equity (CEQ) 
are exported from COMPUSTAT. 
Financial Situation 
(Target) 
Financial situation is a dummy variable. It equals to one if Altman Z-Score is below 
1.8 and it is zero otherwise. Altman Z-Score= 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C +0.6D + 1.0E. 
Where A = Working capital/Total assets; B = Retained earnings/Total assets; C = 
Earnings before interest and tax/Total assets; D = Market value of equity/Total 
liabilities; E = Sales/Total assets. If Altman Z-Score is below 1.8, it means that the 
company has financial situations and probably goes to bankruptcy. Data are at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding the observation year. Source: COMPUSTAT. 
Share Turnover (Target) 
As Cornett et al. (2011), we also define share turnover as “the ratio of the number 
of shares of stock traded for the firm to the total shares outstanding and use this 
measure as a proxy for discrepancies in valuation.” Common shares traded 
(CSHTR_C) and common shares outstanding (CSHO) are exported from 
COMPUSTAT annual database. Data are at the end of fiscal year preceding the 
observation year. 
Return One Year Prior It represents a firm's stock return 4 quarters prior to the observation period. 
Price Change (Target) 
In general a firm experiences stock price fluctuation prior to the lawsuit filing date. 
To reflect this phenomenon, we calculate percent change of a target’s stock price 
over one year prior to lawsuit filing date. Data source: CRSP. 
Run Up (Target) 
Price run-up is used to measure targets’ price change between -42 and -2 days prior 
to the announcement. It is calculated as (stock price-2 – stock price-42)/stock price-42. 
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Control Variables Description 
Relative Size 
Relative size compares the target’s firm size with its acquirer’s. It is the ratio of the 
target’s total asset to its bidder’s asset. All firm size data are exported from 
COMPUSTAT. The data are at the end of fiscal year preceding the observation 
year. 
Number of Bidders It counts the number of bidders when a takeover is announced. Data source: SDC. 
Industry Surprise (Target) 
Industry surprise is used to measure merger intensity. It equals to one if at least one 
acquisition happens in the sample firms’ industry one year prior to the observation 
year and zero otherwise. The industry is defined as four-digit SIC code by 
COMPUSTAT. 
Horizontal 
Horizontal is a dummy variable showing whether the target and the bidder are in 
the same industry or not. It takes the value of one if both the target and the bidder 
are in the same industry and it is zero otherwise. The industry is defined as four-
digit SIC code by COMPUSTAT. 
Hostile 
Follow Cornett et al. (2011), hostile is a dummy variable. It equals to one if the 
tender offer is defined as “hostile” or “unsolicited” by SDC and it is zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC. 
All Cash 
All Cash is a takeover payment measurement. It is a dummy variable which equals 
to one if consideration is recorded as “cash only” by SDC and it is zero otherwise. 
All Stock 
All Stock is a dummy variable which equals to one if consideration is recorded as 
“stock only” by SDC and it is zero otherwise. 
Cross Border 
Cross Border is a dummy variable which equals to one if the deal is recorded by 






This table presents the expected signs of the control variables used in our regression models. ''+/-'' indicates 
that the sign has been inconsistent in previous studies, and ''/'' indicates that the variable is excluded in the 
model. (1)Logistic Regression for Predicting Target Candidacy (2)Logistic Regression for Predicting Takeover 
Completion (3)Logistic Regression for Predicting Cash Payment (4)OLS Regression for Predicting Takeover 
Premiums 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Previous Mergers (Target) + + + - 
Log of Assets (Target) - - - - 
Market to Book Ratio (Target) +/- - - - 
Market to Book Ratio (Acquirer) +/- + + + 
Leverage (Target) - - - +/- 
Leverage (Acquirer) - - - +/- 
Cash Ratio (Target) / +/- +/- - 
Sales Growth (Target) +/- +/- +/- + 
PE Ratio (Target) + + +/- - 
ROE (Target) + + + + 
Financial Situation (Target) + + - +/- 
Share Turnover (Target) +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Return One Year Prior - / / / 
Price Change (Target) / + +/- +/- 
Run Up (Target) / + +/- - 
Relative Size / - +/- +/- 
Number of Bidders / + + + 
Industry Surprise (Target) + +/- +/- + 
Horizontal / +/- +/- +/- 
Hostile / +/- - + 
All Cash / +/- / +/- 
All Stock / +/- / +/- 
Cross Border / / + / 
 
